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Abstract
Since 1985, U.S. agricultural producers have been required to practice soil
conservation on highly erodible cropland and conserve wetlands as a condi-
tion of farm program eligibility. This report discusses the general characteris-
tics of compliance incentives, evaluates their effectiveness in reducing erosion
in the program’s current form, and explores the potential for expanding the
compliance approach to address nutrient runoff from crop production. While
soil erosion has, in fact, been reduced on land subject to Conservation
Compliance, erosion is also down on land not subject to Conservation
Compliance, indicating the influence of other factors. Analysis to isolate the
influence of Conservation Compliance incentives from other factors suggests
that about 25 percent of the decline in soil erosion between 1982 and 1997
can be attributed to Conservation Compliance. This report also finds that
compliance incentives have likely deterred conversion of noncropped highly
erodible land and wetland to cropland, and that a compliance approach could
be used effectively to address nutrient runoff from crop production.
Keywords: conservation compliance, Sodbuster, Swampbuster, conservation
policy, agri-environmental policy, nutrient management, buffer practices.
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Farm commodity programs may have encouraged crop production on envi-
ronmentally sensitive land in the 1970s and early 1980s. Although unintend-
ed, farm program incentives to expand production may have increased envi-
ronmental damage associated with agricultural production and undercut the
effectiveness of conservation programs designed to mitigate that damage.
Compliance provisions, introduced in the Food Security Act (1985 Farm
Act), aim to counteract that influence. 
In essence, compliance provisions leverage farm program payments for the
environment; farmers who want to remain eligible for benefits from selected
Federal agricultural programs, including price support loans and income
support payments, must implement soil conservation systems on highly
erodible land (HEL) and refrain from draining wetlands. The question
addressed by this report is to what extent compliance provisions created suf-
ficient incentives to motivate the types of behavioral shifts they were
designed to address. 
In fact, the annual rate of soil erosion on U.S. cropland declined by nearly
40 percent between 1982 and 1997. About a fourth of that decline can be
directly attributed to compliance. But that is only part of the story. A large
share of cropland erosion reduction occurred on land that was not subject to
compliance requirements. Non-HEL cropland accounted for 38 percent of
all cropland erosion reduction. This begs the question: How much erosion
reduction would have been realized without compliance requirements?
Reduced soil erosion on land not subject to compliance suggests that other
factors, such as technology, information, and markets, played an important
role in triggering large-scale erosion reduction. Conversely, compliance may
have acted as a catalyst for change, accelerating the adoption of farming
practices—such as conservation tillage—that can conserve soil and save
farmers money. 
Compliance mechanisms have clearly increased consistency between
income support and environmental programs. While consistency is an
important goal, this report focuses on the broader potential of the compli-
ance mechanism as an agri-environmental policy instrument.
Compliance mechanisms may provide the best bang for the buck as a
deterrent to environmentally damaging actions such as draining wet-
lands or bringing new HEL into crop production. Compliance sanctions
are triggered only when a violation occurs. In contrast, using conservation
payments to achieve these same ends is likely to be difficult or expensive.
The difficulty is in deciding which wetlands or noncropped HEL are vulner-
able enough to warrant conservation payments. If that is too difficult, poli-
cymakers could opt to subsidize protection of a significant share of these
environmentally sensitive lands—an expensive alternative, indeed. 
Compliance incentives have motivated farmers to reduce soil erosion on
highly erodible cropland. Between 1982 and 1987, excess erosion (any ero-
sion in excess of the maximum level consistent with maintaining soil produc-
tivity) on highly erodible cropland fell by 331 million tons annually. Nearly
v
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Economic Research Service/USDA90 percent of this reduction occurred on farms receiving government program
payments, and thus can be directly attributed to conservation compliance. 
Compliance incentives may deter producers from expanding crop pro-
duction onto highly erodible land or wetland. Without compliance
requirements, between 7 million and 14 million acres of highly erodible
land or wetland that are not currently being farmed could be profitably con-
verted to crop production, under favorable market conditions.
Existing government payments have the potential to leverage a broader
set of agricultural conservation and environmental gains. The majority
of cropland with potential for nutrient runoff is located on farms receiving
government program payments. Whether these payments are large enough
to spur farmers to address nutrient runoff depends on the methods available
for remediation and their cost.
Because they depend on payments from other programs for compliance
incentives, compliance mechanisms will be effective only on farms where
government payments exceed the cost of required conservation actions.
vi
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The 1985 Food Security Act (FSA) ushered in a new era of U.S. agri-
environmental policy. Although much attention has been focused on large-
scale, long-term land retirement through the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP), the adoption of compliance mechanisms was an important agri-
environmental policy innovation. In general, compliance mechanisms
require farmers to meet some minimum standard of environmental protec-
tion on environmentally sensitive land as a condition of eligibility for
Federal farm program benefits—principally farm commodity program pay-
ments. Coupled with changes in the 1985 FSA that made commodity pro-
gram participation more attractive to producers, compliance mechanisms
have come to play a significant role in U.S. agri-environmental policy. The
most recent farm bill, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,
retained compliance mechanisms with only minor technical revisions. 
At present, compliance mechanisms address soil conservation on highly
erodible land—provisions widely known as “Conservation Compliance” and
“Sodbuster”—and wetland conservation—a provision widely known as
“Swampbuster.” Conservation Compliance requires producers already crop-
ping highly erodible land (HEL) to implement soil conservation plans or
risk losing their Federal farm program benefits (see box, “Soil Erodibility
and Soil Erosion”). Sodbuster places similar, albeit more stringent, require-
ments on producers who bring previously uncropped HEL into crop produc-
tion. Under Swampbuster, producers who convert wetland for crop produc-
tion can lose Federal farm program benefits. 
Compliance mechanisms are part of broader strategies for soil conservation
and wetland protection. CRP and Conservation Compliance/Sodbuster were
enacted in 1985 as part of an overall strategy to conserve soil. Farmers who
already cropped HEL could adopt required conservation systems or retire
land by enrolling it in the CRP, while Sodbuster was designed to deter farm-
ers from bringing more HEL into crop production. Swampbuster was also
one of a number of policy changes designed to stem wetland loss in agricul-
ture. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated tax breaks that encouraged
conversion of land to crop production, reducing the incentive to convert
both HEL and wetland to crop production, complementing the Sodbuster
and Swampbuster provisions of the 1985 FSA. The Wetland Reserve
Program (WRP), enacted in 1990, restores and protects previously drained
wetlands on agricultural land.
Since compliance mechanisms have taken effect, soil erosion on HEL crop-
land and wetland conversions for agricultural production have declined
sharply (Heimlich et al., 1998; Claassen et al., 2000; 2001). Nonetheless,
questions about the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms remain: What
proportion of overall cropland erosion reduction is actually due to
Conservation Compliance? Is Swampbuster actually constraining wetland
conversion for agricultural production? Will environmental benefits increase
if compliance is extended to address additional environmental problems? 
1
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acteristics, analyze the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms (with par-
ticular focus on the role of Conservation Compliance in reducing soil ero-
sion on highly erodible cropland), and discuss the potential for expanding
compliance to address nutrient runoff and leaching from land in crop 
production.
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Soil Erodibility and Soil Erosion
Largely through compliance mechanisms, U.S. soil conservation policy
targets highly erodible land (HEL). HEL is defined as land with an erodibility
index (EI) of 8 or larger. The erodibility index is, in turn, defined by the ratio
of inherent erodibility to the soil loss tolerance. Inherent erodibility for a
given soil is the rate of erosion (tons per acre per year) that would occur on
land that was continuously clean-tilled throughout the year. The soil loss
tolerance is an estimate of the rate of soil erosion that can occur on a given
soil without significant long-term productivity loss. Thus, the erodibility
index captures both the propensity of a soil to erode and the potential for
damage from erosion. Actual soil erosion, however, reflects a complex inter-
action of climate, topography, soil characteristics, land use, and land manage-
ment practices. Actual erosion is typically far less than a soil's inherent
erodibility due to ground cover (grass, trees, crops, crop residue) and conser-
vation practices (e.g., terraces or windbreaks) installed by farmers and
landowners.
While soil erosion is difficult to measure under field conditions, physical
process models can be used to predict both inherent erodibility and the
average annual rate of soil erosion, given climate, topography, soils, land use,
and land management. The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE; Wischmeier
and Smith, 1978) and, more recently, the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equa-
tion (RUSLE; see http://www.sedlab.olemiss.edu/rusle/overview.html), and
the Wind Erosion Equation (WEE; Skidmore and Woodruff, 1968) have been
used widely in conservation planning and program implementation. 
Because average annual erosion rates can be estimated with and without
various conservation practices, the models have greatly facilitated policy
implementation. Farmers, working with conservation planners, can use phys-
ical process models to develop cost-effective conservation systems. These
models are used to implement conservation compliance and other USDA
conservation programs.Compliance Mechanisms: A Primer
Compliance mechanisms require that agricultural producers undertake cer-
tain resource conservation activities as a condition of eligibility for selected
Federal agricultural programs, including commodity price and income sup-
port programs and voluntary conservation programs such as CRP, WRP, and
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). Producers who vio-
late compliance requirements or who fail to take the required actions to
reduce existing environmental damage may become ineligible for all pro-
gram benefits, not just on those acres where the violation has occurred.
Under Swampbuster, for example, program payments can be denied to pro-
ducers who take action to convert wetland to crop production. Under
Conservation Compliance, producers who fail to act to reduce soil erosion
on HEL cropland can be similarly sanctioned. 
Compliance mechanisms can be viewed in two ways. As a method of policy
coordination, they can reduce unintended adverse environmental conse-
quences of farm programs. As an agri-environmental policy tool, compli-
ance can be used to further agri-environmental objectives. In this latter role,
compliance mechanisms have properties that set them apart from other agri-
environmental policy instruments—especially subsidies designed to encour-
age good environmental performance—making them useful in situations
where subsidies would be difficult or especially costly to use. 
Program coordination was a key motivation for adoption of compliance pro-
visions in the 1985 Food Security Act (FSA). In the 1970s and early 1980s,
evidence suggested that farm commodity programs encouraged production
of relatively erosive crops on erosion-prone land, even as conservation pro-
grams attempted to mitigate these damages (Reichelderfer, 1985). High
commodity prices of the mid-1970s probably spurred the conversion of
highly erodible land from pasture or native grass to crop production—a
process commonly referred to as sodbusting—although evidence linking
this practice with farm commodity programs is limited (Watts et al., 1983;
Heimlich, 1986). Likewise, evidence showing that government payments
were an important incentive to swampbusting is quite limited (see Heimlich
et al., 1998, for a survey), even though the purpose of most wetland
drainage has, historically, been to allow or improve crop production (Dahl,
1990). 
Even if government payments are not a critical underlying motivation for
agricultural production on HEL or wetland, linking payments with compli-
ance requirements can encourage improved environmental performance and
deter producers from expanding crop production onto environmentally sen-
sitive land. Withholding payments on the entire farm, rather than only on
acres in violation of a compliance requirement, makes the potential sanction
quite serious for many farms.
Compliance is a unique policy tool that is not easily placed in traditional
categories of subsidy, tax, or regulation (Heimlich and Claassen, 1998a).
Compliance mechanisms are similar in some ways to both environmental
regulation and environmental taxes, but bear little resemblance to environ-
mental subsidies. Like regulation, compliance mechanisms prescribe limits
on producer actions and provide for penalties (loss of farm program benefits
3
Environmental Compliance in U.S. Agricultural Policy/AER-832
Economic Research Service/USDAin the case of noncompliance). Like taxes and fees, however, violation does
not imply illegal activity and maximum penalties are limited and known in
advance. Unlike an environmental subsidy program (e.g., EQIP1), producers
do not receive a benefit in exchange for taking an action that enhances (or is
designed to enhance) environmental performance. Instead, they are penal-
ized, through withholding of benefits from otherwise unrelated programs,
when an environmental standard is not achieved. One could argue that pro-
grams with a compliance requirement actually seek a “bundle” of benefits
including environmental protection. However, there is no evidence to sug-
gest that commodity program design is influenced by the potential for envi-
ronmental benefits through compliance. Thus, the economic properties of
compliance mechanisms are quite different from those of a classic environ-
mental subsidy program.
In general, compliance mechanisms are not subject to some of the problems
that can arise with the use of environmental subsidies. For example, poorly
designed subsidies for environmental improvement can encourage producers
to continue or expand crop production where it would not otherwise be
profitable, sometimes undercutting environmental gains (see Claassen et al.,
2001, for a full discussion). Moreover, compliance mechanisms do not
require subsidy payments in addition to those already in place through price
and income support or other programs.2 Note, however, that the effective
level of income support provided to complying producers is reduced by the
cost of complying with soil and wetland conservation requirements. These
farm commodity programs provide much of the underlying incentive for
producers to comply.
Compliance mechanisms may be particularly well suited to deter certain
environmentally damaging actions. For example, a hypothetical subsidy
program designed to prevent wetland drainage would require policymakers
to pay for protection of all wetlands on agricultural land—a potentially
expensive proposition—or decide which wetlands are sufficiently vulnerable
to agricultural conversion as to warrant protection—a potentially difficult
task (Heimlich and Claassen, 1998b). In contrast, Swampbuster penalties
are assessed when a violation occurs, eliminating the need for broad-based
subsidies or the need to anticipate the potential for a violation to occur on
any given wetland. No direct costs are imposed on producers, although there
may be an opportunity cost associated with production forgone on wetlands
that would otherwise have been converted to crop production. 
The success of compliance mechanisms depends on the commodity pro-
grams that provide most of the compliance incentive. Farm commodity pro-
grams have been in place for more than 65 years and their benefits have
been largely capitalized into the value of farmland (Goodwin et al., 2003;
Ryan et al., 2001; Barnard et al., 1997; Duffy et al., 1994).3 For many pro-
ducers, the ability to purchase land or pay cash rent depends significantly on
government payments. In addition to introducing compliance mechanisms,
the 1985 FSA shifted the emphasis of commodity programs from price sup-
port to income support. With a market price support program, farmers could
benefit from farm programs without direct participation (sometimes referred
to as “free riding”). With income support payments, producers must partici-
pate to receive benefits. Consequently, many producers may feel that they
4
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1Through EQIP, the Federal
Government shares the cost of
installing or adopting conservation
practices that address key resource
concerns.
2The Government does bear some
cost for existing compliance programs.
USDA provides conservation planning
and technical assistance to producers
without charge. Effective monitoring
and enforcement by USDA can also be
costly. These costs, however, are not
specific to compliance mechanisms.
They would generally be incurred with
the implementation of other types of
agri-environmental programs as well.
3A compliance requirement, to the
extent it reduces a producer’s net
return to farm program participation,
may also reduce capitalization.have little choice but to accept compliance requirements, even though,
strictly speaking, participation in these programs is voluntary and producers
could opt out to avoid compliance requirements. The 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act ended annual acreage set-
aside programs, reducing the cost of program participation and increasing
the compliance incentive.
Although working within the context of existing programs has some advan-
tages over a subsidy mechanism, it also limits the potential effectiveness of
compliance mechanisms. Unlike an environmental subsidy program or regu-
lation, the design of compliance mechanisms is, by definition, constrained
by the existence and design of other farm programs. In other words, the
scope and features of other farm programs largely determine how effective a
compliance mechanism can be. In designing a compliance mechanism, poli-
cymakers can determine: 
• the environmental objective(s); 
• minimum standards of environmental performance or 
practice implementation; 
• the programs and payments that are subject to the compliance sanction. 
But the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms will also depend on other
factors related to commodity programs and the agri-environmental problems
targeted by compliance. These include: 
• whether targeted environmental problems occur largely on farms that
participate in Federal farm programs subject to compliance; 
• the producer’s net benefit from farm program participation before the
compliance requirement; 
• the producer’s cost of meeting the compliance standard or requirement. 
In other words, the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms—relative to
other agri-environmental policy tools—depends largely on the size and spa-
tial distribution of government payments relative to the spatial distribution
of targeted agri-environmental problems and the costs involved in mitigat-
ing those problems. 
Given the configuration of current farm programs, compliance mechanisms
have the potential to address many cropland-based conservation and envi-
ronmental problems. Data from the Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS) show that farms receiving some type of government pay-
ment accounted for 86 percent of U.S. cropland. Other environmental
issues, such as livestock waste management and disposal problems, occur
more frequently on farms that do not participate in current farm programs
and, thus, are less likely candidates for compliance mechanisms. 
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Current compliance mechanisms include Wetland Conservation provisions—
commonly known as Swampbuster—and Highly Erodible Land (HEL)
Conservation provisions, which include provisions commonly referred to as
Conservation Compliance and Sodbuster. Conservation Compliance general-
ly refers to requirements that apply to HEL that was cropped before enact-
ment of the 1985 Food Security Act (FSA). Sodbuster refers to compliance
requirements on HEL converted to crop production after 1985. 
Compliance Objectives and Standards
The objectives of the Highly Erodible Land Conservation provision are to
maintain soil productivity by maintaining soil depth and to reduce offsite
damages due to sediment loads, e.g., to reduce sediment delivered to water
bodies. 
After the 1985 FSA, compliance implementation efforts focused on reduc-
ing erosion to the soil loss tolerance (“T”) level. Developed largely in the
1940s and 1950s, T values were designed to represent the maximum rate of
soil erosion consistent with maintaining a given level of soil productivity
indefinitely. Before Conservation Compliance plans were devised and
implemented on farms, however, several factors prompted movement away
from the T standard. First, there were unresolved questions about the scien-
tific validity of the T value. By the 1970s, the scientific basis for T values
was widely recognized as weak, yet efforts to adjust T values to reflect
higher erosion loss tolerance in some soils were unsuccessful (Cook, 1982).
Alternate methods of assessing the potential for erosion productivity dam-
age had been developed (see Pierce et al.) but were not used by USDA in
establishing compliance requirements. Second, it became apparent that
reducing soil erosion to the T level would be costly on some soils. By 1987,
USDA had determined that reducing erosion to T or even 2T might be so
costly that crop production would no longer be profitable on a great deal of
highly erodible land (Canning, 1994). Finally, policymakers increasingly
recognized the offsite damage associated with sediment (which is unrelated
to T). Offsite damages can be substantial and are often larger than onsite
damages (see Ribaudo, 1989; Ribaudo et al., 1990; Feather et al., 1999). 
Ultimately, Conservation Compliance was implemented to consider both soil
erosion and the cost of erosion reduction, without a fixed erosion standard.
Where erosion could be reduced to the T level without making crop produc-
tion unprofitable, producers were required to develop “basic” conservation
plans (which reduce erosion to T). Where reducing erosion to T was more
costly, producers were allowed to develop “alternative” conservation sys-
tems. Alternative conservation systems require the application of soil conser-
vation practices that are technically and economically feasible in a given
local area and achieve “significant” erosion reduction. However, producers
are not required to reduce erosion to T or any other specific level. Some
alternative systems allowed erosion to remain at 2T or even higher levels.
This focus on local conditions and site-by-site development of conservation
plans allowed conservation systems to be tailored to climate, soils, cropping
patterns, and the producer’s management skills, leading to a broad array of
6
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tinct conservation systems have been approved. Although 51 percent use
only conservation cropping sequences, conservation tillage, crop residue
use, or some combination of these three practices (table 1), this flexibility
probably resulted in more erosion reduction per dollar of cost than could
have been achieved using a more prescriptive approach that relied on a few
standard practices. 
The use of alternative conservation systems is limited to HEL that was
cropped during 1981-85. On HEL not previously cropped—i.e., sodbusted
land—producers must use conservation systems that hold erosion to T,
regardless of cost. In 1996, USDA tightened standards for alternative con-
servation systems developed after July 3, 1996. First, alternative systems
must reduce erosion by at least 75 percent of potential erosion4 and planned
erosion cannot exceed 2T (USDA-NRCS, 1996). An exception is made for
land returning to crop production from the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP), where compliance requirements cannot exceed those in force when
the land entered the CRP. Second, for HEL not cropped during 1981-85,
conservation systems must hold soil erosion to no more than the soil loss
tolerance level (T) and prevent a “substantial increase” in erosion, defined
as 25 percent of potential erosion (USDA-NRCS, 1996).
Wetland Conservation provisions, widely known as Swampbuster, are
designed to protect wetland functions and values by preserving existing wet-
lands.5 Wetland values and functions include wildlife habitat, water purifica-
tion, groundwater recharge, and mitigation of flood peaks. 
To comply with Swampbuster, producers must refrain from altering wet-
lands to make agricultural production possible. In keeping with the focus on
wetland functions and values, however, the 1996 Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act allows some flexibility to alter some
small areas of wetland if certain conditions are met. Producers are exempted
from the sanction if: 
• wetland conversion will have a minimal effect on overall wetland func-
tions and values; 
7
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4Potential erosion is defined as
inherent erodibility as calculated by
the Universal Soil Loss Equation and
Wind Erosion Equation. 
5See regulations implementing
Swampbuster, 7 CFR 12, 61 FR
47019.
Table 1—Conservation management systems and practices applied on
HEL cropland subject to compliance, 1997
Item  Percent of cultivated HEL
Conservation management systems
Conservation cropping/crop residue use  27.5
Conservation cropping/conservation tillage  10.8
Conservation cropping only  7.8
Crop residue use only  4.9
Total 51.0
Conservation practices*
Total with conservation cropping  81.1
Total with crop residue use  51.3
Total with conservation tillage  33.0
*Percentages sum to more than 100 because some conservation systems require the applica-
tion of more than one practice.
Source: USDA, ERS, compiled from NRCS 1997 Status Review of Conservation Compliance
data.• the wetland conversion project is fully mitigated through creation or
restoration of similar wetlands in the same general area; 
• the action is permitted under the Clean Water Act and the Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) determines that mitigation
requirements are adequate; or 
• a wetland is inadvertently altered without intent to violate the law and
the wetland is restored within 1 year.
Programs and Payments Subject to Compliance
Producers who violate compliance requirements may be denied benefits
from a wide range of Federal agricultural programs. Ongoing commodity
and disaster programs make up the large majority of direct payments subject
to compliance, accounting for 92 percent of these payments in fiscal year
(FY) 2000, 90 percent in FY 2001, and 79 percent in FY 2002 (table 2). The
2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act will extend similar
payments, in similar amounts, to a slightly broader group of producers (see
box, “Farm Programs in the 2002 Farm Act: Will Compliance Be
Affected?”). Conservation payments are also significant, including the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetland Reserve Program (WRP),
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Emergency
Conservation Program (ECP), and the Watershed Protection and Flood
Prevention Program. Conservation program spending is authorized to
expand by 80 percent over the life of the 2002 FSRI Act.6 Federally subsi-
dized crop insurance, which could be withheld under the original compli-
ance provisions enacted in 1985, was removed from the list of programs
8
Environmental Compliance in U.S. Agricultural Policy/AER-832
Economic Research Service/USDA
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Farm Bill side-by-side comparison of




Table 2—Direct payments subject to Wetland and/or HEL conservation provisions
FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002
actual actual actual actual actual actual
Million $
Ongoing commodity programs
Production Flexibility Contract 6,350 5,719 5,476 5,057 4,105 3,968
Loan Deficiency 0 0 3,360 6,419 5,293 5,345
Other direct payments* 0 0 277 1 1,159 182
Subtotal--Commodity programs 6,350 5,719 9,113 11,477 10,557 9,495
Disaster programs
Market Loss Assistance 0 0 3,011 12,436 5,455 0
Noninsured Disaster 63 69 54 38 64 181
Disaster 48 15 2,264 1,452 3,146 254
Subtotal--Disaster 111 84 5,329 13,926 8,665 435
Conservation programs
Conservation Reserve Program 1,774 1,798 1,462 1,513 1,655 1,785
Environmental Quality Incentives Program 200 200 170 170 163 313
Wetland Reserve Program 119 219 123 165 182 263
Emergency Conservation Program 25 29 28 50 80 0
Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention 90 106 194 176 102 200
Subtotal--Conservation 2,208 2,352 1,977 2,074 2,182 2,561
Total 8,669 8,155 16,419 27,477 21,404 12,491
* Includes cotton user marketing payments and other direct payments.
Source: ERS, based on data from the Office of Budget and Program Analysis, USDA, the Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation final
rule (7 CFR 12, 61 FR 47019), and communications with national program staff, Farm Service Agency, USDA.9
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Farm Programs in the 2002 Farm Bill:
Will Compliance Be Affected?
Compliance requirements are continued in the 2002 Farm Security and Rural
Investment (FSRI) Act with only minor, technical changes. Changes in
commodity and conservation programs, however, may affect producers'
incentives to participate in Federal farm programs and, therefore, meet
compliance requirements.
Spending on commodity and conservation programs is projected to increase
by 80 percent (compared with continuing current programs), according to
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates. However, much of the
increase in commodity program spending will replace ad hoc "market loss
assistance" payments provided to producers annually by Congress for the
1998-2001 seasons. Thus, a majority of new funds authorized directly in the
FSRI Act will go to producers of traditional program crops: corn, wheat,
cotton, rice, sorghum, oats, and barley. Ad hoc disaster assistance, which has
been authorized by Congress frequently in recent years, may be distributed
somewhat differently, but is likely to augment commodity program spending
mandated by the 2002 FSRI Act. 
A modest amount of new spending will be used to extend commodity
program payments to crops not previously eligible for these subsidies. For the
first time, producers of soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts will be eligible
for direct payments. Soybean and other oilseed producers were already
eligible for price support loans. Price support loans will also be extended to
producers of peanuts, wool, mohair, honey, small chickpeas, lentils, and dry
peas. Whether these program extensions will expand the reach of compliance
depends on (1) the acreage devoted to these crops and (2) whether farms
producing them are already subject to compliance through production of other
program crops. 
Analysis of Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data in
conjunction with the National Resources Inventory (NRI) indicates that peanuts,
wool, mohair, honey, small chickpeas, lentils, and dry peas are produced by
more than 35,000 farms that encompass more than 8 million acres of highly
erodible cropland. Nearly all of these farms, however, already receive Federal
farm program payments based on other crops. We estimate that fewer than 5,000
farms encompassing less than 500,000 highly erodible cropland acres could
come under compliance requirements for the first time. Thus, program expansion
can be expected to have little, if any, effect on the reach or overall effectiveness
of conservation compliance (or other compliance mechanisms). 
Conservation program spending is also projected to increase by 80 percent.
Over the 6-year life of the 2002 FSRI Act, the CBO projects conservation
spending of $20.9 billion. The largest increases are for "working land"
conservation programs, i.e., programs that support good conservation prac-
tices on land in agricultural production. Key working land programs include
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the newly formu-
lated Conservation Security Program (CSP). Authorized funding was also
increased for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetland Reserve
Program (WRP), and a range of other conservation and environmental
programs. Because these programs are open to all producers—not just
producers of certain crops—and can address a wide range of agri-environ-
mental problems, the extent to which expansion of these programs could
extend compliance requirements is unknown.subject to compliance in the 1996 Act and is not currently subject to compli-
ance requirements.
Eligibility for Federal agriculture-related loans or loan guarantees (e.g.,
price support loans and farm credit loans) can also be denied (table 3).
Unlike direct payments, the actual benefit received by producers is less than
that indicated by the program level. While the program level is the total
amount available for direct loans or loan guarantees, most direct loans and
loans covered by a guarantee are, in fact, repaid. Producer subsidies come in
the form of lower interest rates than would otherwise be available. For
example, direct government loans (e.g., price support loans) are often pro-
vided at rates lower than are commercially available. Other loan and loan
guarantee programs provide credit or assistance in obtaining credit for farm-
ers who cannot afford commercially available credit. 
The effectiveness of compliance depends critically on the spatial distribu-
tion of payments relative to the environmental problems addressed through
compliance mechanisms. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of key
commodity program payments for the 1998 crop year: Production
Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, Market Loss Assistance (MLA) pay-
ments, and Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs).7 These payments are con-
centrated in the Corn Belt, the Plains States, and the Mississippi Delta—
areas that account for roughly two-thirds of U.S. cropland. Although the
total amount of these payments has varied from year to year, we assume that
the spatial distribution of these payments does not change significantly from
year to year because it depends largely on the spatial distribution of base
acres.8 Our assumption is consistent with the USDA baseline, which
assumes ongoing funding for income support tied to base acreage. Ad hoc
disaster payments, approved by Congress on an annual basis, could shift the
distribution of overall payments if a significant share of ad hoc payments
goes to farmers who are not clients of the traditional farm commodity pro-
grams. Recent history suggests, however, that these payments will augment,
not replace, more traditional farm income support payments. 
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7Loan Deficiency Payments and
Market Loss Assistance payments
associated with the 1998 crop were
made largely during FY 1999.
8Base acres are the land that is eli-
gible for income support payments
through Federal farm commodity pro-
grams. Base acreage is determined by
historical plantings, and does not
depend on current crop acreages. 





Price support/Marketing asst. loans 8,358 9,669 8,567
Farm storage facility loans* 0 102 81
Total--Commodity loan programs 8,358 9,771 8,648
Farm credit loan programs
Farm operating loans 2,565 2,465 2,153
Farm ownership loans 944 1,106 1,016
Emergency loans 330 151 90
Total--Farm credit loan programs 3,839 3,722 3,259
Total--Loan programs 12,197 13,493 11,907
*Not subject to Wetland Conservation provisions.
Source: ERS, based on data from the Office of Budget and Program Analysis, USDA, the
Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation final rule (7 CFR 12, 61 FR 47019), and com-
munications with national program staff, Farm Service Agency, USDA.Analysis of Conservation Compliance
According to USDA’s annual Conservation Compliance Status Review
(CSR), overall compliance with Conservation Compliance provisions is
high. Based on the 1997 CSR data (the year matching the most recent
National Resources Inventory, which we use extensively in the analysis that
follows), 95.9 percent of producers subject to compliance were actively
applying approved conservation systems. In more recent years, the CSR has
shown compliance rates of roughly 98 percent. The 1997 data also indicate
that the distribution of HEL cropland by erosion rate has shifted dramatical-
ly to lower erosion rates (fig. 2). In other words, the rate of soil erosion has
declined significantly on most HEL cropland acres subject to compliance. 
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study, however, identifies defi-
ciencies in the CSR that cast some doubt on NRCS compliance estimates
(see box, “Enforcement: The Compliance Status Review”). GAO criticized
the CSR on the selection of the review sample, a lack of consistency and
clarity in the guidance provided to local offices, data handling and analysis,
failure to cite producers for significant deficiencies, and inadequate justifica-
tion for waiver of penalties. 
We take an alternate approach, using existing datasets not created for the
express purpose of evaluating compliance mechanisms in an attempt to deter-
mine the overall effectiveness of compliance in reducing erosion on HEL
11
Environmental Compliance in U.S. Agricultural Policy/AER-832
Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 1
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Source: Farm Service Agency.cropland. It is clear that erosion has been reduced on land subject to compli-
ance—even if the magnitude of those reductions is somewhat in doubt. Even
so, a broader look at soil erosion reduction provides context for evaluating the
overall role of Conservation Compliance in achieving those reductions.
Specifically, what is the extent of erosion reduction that can be directly attrib-
uted to Conservation Compliance? Has soil erosion been reduced more on
land subject to compliance than on land not subject to compliance? 
We analyze these questions using a two-step process. First, we analyze
overall erosion reduction using data from the 1997 and previous National
Resources Inventories (NRI). (See box, “Conservation Compliance and NRI
Point Data”). The NRI contains data on HEL cropland and changes in annu-
al erosion over time but, with the exception of the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), do not specify whether a specific tract is enrolled in a gov-
ernment program. We use NRI data to estimate the amount of erosion reduc-
tion that could be directly attributed to compliance, if it occurred on land in
a farm receiving payments subject to compliance. In other words, we
believe that reduction in “excess” erosion (erosion exceeding T) on HEL
that was cropped in both 1982 and 1997, if it occurred on a farm receiving
payments subject to compliance, is the best estimate of erosion reduction
that could be directly attributed to Conservation Compliance. We exclude
erosion reduction below the T level on HEL cropland because it was not
required by Conservation Compliance. We note, however, that the discrete
nature of conservation practices may have resulted in the development of
Conservation Compliance systems with erosion rates of less than T.
Moreover, because compliance requirements were designed to allow HEL
cropland to remain in crop production, we exclude erosion reduction due to
land-use change. No erosion reduction would have been required on HEL
cropland with a pre-compliance erosion rate equal to or less than T. Erosion
reduction on non-HEL cropland is clearly not subject to compliance. 
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Figure 2
Distribution of highly erodible cropland subject to compliance 
by soil erosion rate before and after Conservation Compliance, 1997
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Enforcement:The Compliance Status Review
The Food Security Act Compliance Status Review (CSR) is USDA's primary
mechanism for enforcement of Highly Erodible Land Conservation (HELC)
and Wetland Conservation (WC) provisions. Each year, through the CSR,
USDA field staff assess HEL and wetland compliance on a sample of tracts
that are identified as part of farms receiving Federal farm program payments
subject to HELC or WC provisions. Some tracts are selected at random from
USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) database while others are added by
State FSA offices because of potential for noncompliance. For example, tracts
on which temporary variances or waivers were previously granted must be
checked to establish a return to full compliance. 
In 2001, a total of 17,723 tracts were reviewed, including about 4.9 million
acres (from NRI we estimate that there are about 330 million acres of crop-
land and 104 million acres of HEL cropland). Of the total tracts, 13,552 were
identified through random sampling of the national database, while 4,171
were added by States. The CSR summary prepared by the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) shows 98 percent of reviewed tracts and 98.9
percent of reviewed acres in compliance with HELC requirements. Of that
total, roughly 3 percent were in compliance, but were complying with a vari-
ance, condition, or exception. For example, variances can be granted for
personal hardship or unusual weather-related factors that made it impossible
to carry out the plan. Potential WC violations were found in 0.7 percent of
tracts reviewed. These results are consistent with previous compliance
reviews that showed HELC compliance of 97-98 percent. 
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Agricultural Conservation:
USDA Needs to Better Ensure Protection of Highly Erodible Croplands and
Wetlands, identified a variety of deficiencies in the CSR that "make question-
able USDA's claim that 98 percent of the Nation's cropland tracts subject to
the conservation provisions are in compliance" (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2003). GAO criticized USDA's CSR on a variety of issues, including
methods used to select the review sample, consistency and clarity of guidance
provided to local offices, data handling and analysis, failure to cite producers
for significant deficiencies, and inadequate justification for waiver of penalties.
For example, one issue raised by the GAO report is the inclusion in the CSR
of many tracts that do not require a compliance plan. In the 2001 CSR, 33
percent of the tracts reviewed did not require conservation plans. Often, these
tracts were permanent pasture or rangeland, yet these tracts are included as in
compliance with HELC and WC provisions. If these tracts are removed from
the CSR data, the overall compliance rate drops to 92.8 percent.
Deficiencies in the CSR identified by GAO do not necessarily imply that
HELC provisions have been ineffective in reducing soil erosion on highly
erodible cropland. Even if better enforcement could increase erosion reduc-
tions and associated environmental benefits, erosion reductions due to
compliance may have been significant. The uncertainty suggests the impor-
tance of improved evaluation of conservation compliance.Second, we combine NRI data with data on farms whose operators respond-
ed to the 1997 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).
Combining these data sets allows us to: 
• gauge the proportion of HEL cropland located on farms that receive pay-
ments subject to compliance; 
• estimate the distribution of payments over HEL cropland acres; and 
• calculate the reduction in excess erosion (erosion exceeding T) on HEL
that was cropped in both 1982 and 1997 on farms with and without gov-
ernment payments. 
Reduction in excess erosion on HEL cropped in 1982 and 1997 that is locat-
ed on farms with payments is our estimate of erosion reduction that could
be directly attributed to compliance. Other factors, such as technical change,
may have also played a role. 
Erosion Reduction, 1982-1997
The 1985 FSA required development of Conservation Compliance plans by
1990 and full implementation by 1995. Between 1982 and 1997, annual
cropland erosion declined by 1.174 billion tons per year, a reduction of
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Compliance Requirements and NRI Point Data
The National Resources Inventory (NRI) is a sample of roughly 1.3 million
points of land throughout the United States. For each point, NRI provides a
wealth of data on land use and land condition. Typically, the NRI contains
data for three points of land within each primary sampling unit (PSU), which
is usually a 40-acre tract. Because the characteristics of land vary continu-
ously, sampling at discrete points allows single-valued measures of land use,
soil type, topography, etc. When appropriately weighted, the point data can be
aggregated to produce estimates of land use, soil erosion, etc. 
Compliance requirements, however, are determined on a field-by-field basis.
To be subject to compliance, a field must be made up predominately of highly
erodible soils. If a field is designated as highly erodible land (HEL), conser-
vation requirements apply to the entire field, not just the highly erodible
portion of the field. Field boundaries are carefully defined to make it difficult
for producers to redefine fields to avoid compliance requirements. 
Using point-based data from NRI to analyze a field-based program like
Conservation Compliance may lead to some estimation errors. Some NRI
points of HEL may fall in fields that are not predominately HEL and, there-
fore, not subject to compliance requirements. Any reduction in excess erosion
at these points could be incorrectly included in our estimate of soil erosion
reduction that could be attributed to Conservation Compliance. Likewise, NRI
points of non-HEL land may be located in fields that are predominately HEL
and, therefore, could be incorrectly excluded from our estimate of soil erosion
that can be attributed to Conservation Compliance.
Because the spatial relationship between field boundaries and NRI points is
unknown, it is impossible to accurately assess the level of error introduced by
this difference in program implementation and data collection. The errors
may, to some extent, offset one another because some points that should be
included are excluded and vice versa. nearly 40 percent (table 4). Average annual wind and water erosion declined
by 541.6 million tons and 632.8 million tons, respectively.
Erosion reductions that cannot be attributed directly to compliance account
for erosion reductions of 843.4 million tons per year. These reductions in
average annual erosion include 442.3 million tons on non-HEL cropland,
365 million tons due to land-use change (290 million tons due to CRP
enrollment of HEL cropland, and 74.9 million tons due to a net movement
of HEL land out of crop production9) and 36.2 million tons of “non-excess”
erosion on HEL cropland (fig. 3). 
Reduction in excess erosion on HEL cropped in 1982 and 1997 was 331 mil-
lion tons, 28.2 percent of all erosion reduction and 42.8 percent of all erosion
reduction not associated with land retirement in CRP. More than 60 percent of
this erosion reduction, 207.7 million tons per year, was excess erosion due to
water while 123.3 million tons was excess erosion due to wind. The proportion
of these reductions that occurred on farms receiving government payments—
which we estimate in the following section—is our best estimate of erosion
reduction that could be directly attributed to Conservation Compliance. 
Some portion of other erosion reductions could be indirectly attributed to
Conservation Compliance. Erosion reduction on some non-HEL cropland
may be indirectly attributed to compliance if conservation systems were also
adopted on non-HEL cropland within the complying farm. For example,
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9While some HEL land was shifted
into crop production, more was shifted
out of crop production.
Table 4—Erosion reduction on U.S. cropland between 1982 and 1997
Cropland erosion, 1982 Cropland erosion, 1997 Change in erosion due to 
Cropland type Water Wind Totals Water Wind Totals Water Wind Totals
Million tons per year
HEL
Cropped in 1982 and 1997
Excess erosion1 432.9 396.8 829.7 225.2 273.5 498.7 -207.7 -123.3 -331.0
Non-excess erosion 147.6 140.8 288.4 134.9 117.3 252.2 -12.7 -23.5 -36.2
Land-use change
CRP2 114.8 175.2 290.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -114.8 -175.2 -290.0
Non-CRP3 119.3 48.6 167.9 54.3 38.7 93.0 -65.0 -9.9 -74.9
Total, HEL 814.6 761.4 1,576.0 414.4 429.5 843.9 -400.2 -331.9 -732.1
Non-HEL
Cropped in 1982 and 1997 737.1 540.8 1,277.9 611.8 386.7 998.5 -125.3 -154.1 -279.4
Land-use change
CRP 62.1 47.8 109.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -62.1 -47.8 -109.9
Non-CRP 74.7 22.0 96.7 29.5 14.2 43.7 -45.2 -7.8 -53.0
Total, non-HEL 873.9 610.6 1,484.5 641.3 400.9 1,042.2 -232.6 -209.7 -442.3
Total
Cropped in 1982 and 1997 1,317.6 1,078.4 2,396.0 971.9 777.5 1,749.4 -345.7 -300.9 -646.6
Land-use change
CRP 176.9 223.0 399.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -176.9 -223.0 -399.9
Non-CRP 194.0 70.6 264.6 83.8 52.9 136.7 -110.2 -17.7 -127.9
Total, HEL and non-HEL 1,688.5 1,372.0 3,060.5 1,055.7 830.4 1,886.1 -632.8 -541.6 -1,174.4
1Excess erosion is equal to erosion less the soil loss tolerance or "T" value, or zero, whichever is larger.
2CRP erosion is minus 1982 erosion on land cropped in 1982 but in CRP in 1997.
3Non-CRP land-use change is 1997 erosion on land cropped in 1997 but not 1982, less 1982 erosion on land cropped in 1982 but not 1997.
Source: ERS analysis of NRI dataconservation tillage may have reduced costs for some producers, prompting
its use on non-HEL cropland as well. Even though compliance requirements
were designed to keep compliance costs low, some producers may have
opted to convert land to grass or forest to avoid these costs. The extent to
which these erosion reductions can be attributed to compliance is unknown. 
There is also evidence to suggest Sodbuster sanctions may have deterred
some producers from initiating crop production on HEL not previously
cropped. Unlike Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster requires that produc-
ers apply basic conservation systems—which achieve the T standard—on
previously uncropped land, regardless of cost. Claassen et al. (2000) show
that, depending on the level of commodity price expectations, between 7
and 14 million HEL acres that were not cropped in 1992 are located near
existing cropland and have inherent soil productivity high enough to make
crop production profitable in the absence of Sodbuster. 
Erosion Reduction and Farm Program Participation
Soil erosion reduction that could be directly attributed to Conservation
Compliance is the reduction in excess erosion on HEL that was cropped in
both 1982 and 1997 (331 million tons) and is located on farms that receive
government payments. A simple overlay of HEL cropland data with data on
government payments suggests that most HEL cropland is located in areas
with at least a moderate level of government payments (fig. 4). In this section,
we go beyond the simple overlay to estimate the number of HEL acres on
farms with and without government payments, as well as the reduction in
excess erosion on farms with and without payments.
To provide an estimate of the overlap between farms receiving government
payments and HEL cropland, we combined environmental and resource data
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Figure 3
Erosion reduction and Conservation Compliance, 1982-97
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Source: ERS analysis of 1997 NRI and 1997 ARMS data.
331 295from the NRI with production and financial data (including data on govern-
ment payments received) from ARMS (see Appendix 1). This analysis
defines government payments as farm commodity program payments, disas-
ter payments, and conservation payments from the CRP, WRP, and EQIP.
These payments account for roughly 98 percent of direct payments poten-
tially subject to compliance mechanisms. We use 1997 payments to match
available environmental data from the 1997 NRI. Although total payments
subject to compliance have been much higher in years since 1997, their spa-
tial distribution has remained relatively constant over these years. 
We estimate that more than 83 percent of HEL cropland is located on farms
that receive farm commodity program, disaster, or conservation payments
(fig. 5). Of cropland that is highly erodible due to wind, 92 percent is locat-
ed on farms receiving payments, while about 75 percent of cropland that is
highly erodible due to water is located on farms receiving payments. Results
vary across regions10 (fig. 6) and farm types (fig. 7). HEL cropland on
farms not receiving payments is estimated to account for more than 50 per-
cent of HEL acreage in only two regions—the Eastern Uplands and
Southern Seaboard—regions with a high proportion of livestock-oriented
farms. In other regions, 65-95 percent of HEL cropland is estimated to be
located on farms that receive payments.
While the large majority of HEL cropland is located on farms receiving pay-
ments, payments are not distributed evenly across HEL acres. A large share of
17
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10For ERS Farm Resource Regions,
see figure 8.
Figure 4
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Figure 5
Highly erodible cropland acreage subject to Conservation Compliance  
on farms receiving and not receiving farm program payments, 1997






Source: ERS analysis of 1997 NRI and 1997 ARMS data.
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Figure 6
Highly erodible cropland on farms receiving and not receiving 
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Other cropspayments go to farms that have little or no HEL cropland, while many farms
with large acreage of HEL cropland receive relatively modest government pay-
ments. We estimate that roughly 28 percent of HEL cropland is located on
farms that received total government payments of less than $15 per HEL acre
in 1997, and nearly 50 percent is on farms that received less than $30 per HEL
acre (fig. 9). Note, once again, that payments have been higher in more recent
years (table 2). Low violation rates imply that most producers who received
only modest payments are fulfilling Compliance requirements. If true, the net
benefit of program participation to these producers exceeds the cost of compli-
ance, whatever the level of payments per HEL acre.
We estimate that reduction in excess wind and water erosion on land
cropped in both 1982 and 1997 has been larger on farms receiving payments
than on farms not receiving payments (fig. 10). For wind erosion, the differ-
ence is large. Excess wind erosion declined by 30.7 percent on farms receiv-
ing payments while declining only 14.2 percent on farms not receiving pay-
ments. For water erosion, the difference is somewhat smaller. Excess water
erosion dropped by 46.7 percent on HEL cropland on farms receiving pay-
ments while the decrease was 40.5 percent on farms not receiving payments.
Overall, an erosion reduction of 294.6 million tons per year could be direct-
ly attributed to Conservation Compliance—about 89 percent of the 331 mil-
lion tons of excess erosion reduction on HEL cropland cropped in 1982 and
1997 and 25 percent of all erosion reduction (fig. 3).
In summary, cropland erosion reduction between 1982 and 1997 was wide-
spread. Erosion was reduced on land that is clearly not subject to compliance
(e.g., non-HEL cropland) as well as land that probably is. About 89 percent of
the reduction in excess erosion on HEL cropped in both 1982 and 1997—land
subject to compliance—occurred on farms receiving payments, which
accounted for roughly 83 percent of all HEL cropland. The difference was
much greater for wind-erodible soils than for water-erodible soils. Substantial
water quality, air quality, and soil productivity benefits are likely to have
resulted from these erosion reductions (Canning, 1994; Hyberg, 1997).
Compliance Costs
The above analysis suggests that many producers are in compliance even
though program benefits per acre of HEL cropland are modest for some
farms. This result is not surprising, because a flexible standard helped to
keep costs low. The result also suggests that practices that are widely used
in compliance systems are inexpensive. More than half of all conservation
systems are some combination of conservation tillage, conservation crop-
ping, and seasonal crop residue management.
Conservation tillage systems leave at least 30 percent of the soil surface cov-
ered with crop residue at planting time. While conservation tillage systems
have the potential to reduce production costs, the evidence is mixed—labor,
fuel, and capital costs may decline while herbicide or fertilizer costs may
increase in many situations (Sandretto, 1997). Climate and soil conditions also
play a role. Soils that are not tilled or tilled less may warm up and dry out
more slowly than with conventional tillage. McBride (1999) notes that per-
bushel cost advantages to conservation tillage in corn may be greatest in the
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Figure 10
Percent change in excess erosion on highly erodible cropland on farms
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Figure 8Plains States where reduced tillage can conserve moisture and help boost
yields. Wet, cold conditions can lead to emergence problems and slow early-
season plant growth, which can reduce yields (Griffith et al., 1988). Seasonal
crop residue management differs from conservation tillage in that the seedbed
is clean-tilled, but the previous year’s crop residue is allowed to remain on the
surface longer to protect the soil. Tillage costs are not reduced, but the period
available for tillage is decreased, increasing the potential for delayed planting
due to weather. Conservation cropping may include production of less prof-
itable crops or the cost of establishing cover crops for a portion of the season.
One source of national data on the potential cost of conservation practices is
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) database. EQIP pay-
ments do not directly represent estimates of cost. Payments indicate what
some producers were willing to accept to implement land management con-
servation practices. Since EQIP is a voluntary program, we assume that pay-
ments cover at least the producer’s cost, less any potential benefit that the
producer can capture (e.g., lower fertilizer costs under nutrient manage-
ment). For structural practices, such as filter strips, the payment is a cost-
share (up to 75 percent in EQIP). For land management practices typical in
Conservation Compliance systems, the EQIP payment could exceed produc-
er costs. Incentive payments are provided for up to 3 years to smooth the
transition to new production practices.
Nationally, the average incentive payment for producers adopting conserva-
tion cropping is $6.82 per acre annually for 3 years, and 95 percent of
enrolled producers received $10.00 or less per acre annually for 3 years.
Because incentive payments last only 3 years, we assume that the net pres-
ent value of the payments covers the cost of practice adoption. Using a 4-
percent rate of discount, the net present value (NPV) of 3 years worth of the
average conservation cropping payment would be $18.92, while 95 percent
of producers would receive payments with a NPV of less than $27.75 (table
5). For conservation tillage (not including no-till), the average incentive is
$20.36 per acre (NPV over 3 years), while 95 percent of producers received
$33.40 or less. EQIP participants adopting crop residue use techniques
received $14.58 on average, and 95 percent received $27.75 or less. 
Average payments for specific conservation practices vary regionally (table
6). The average NPV of EQIP incentive payments for conservation cropping
ranges from $10.36 in the Prairie Gateway to $26.74 in the Southern
Seaboard. For conservation tillage, the average incentive payment varies
from $18.89 to $31.77, with the lowest payments in the Prairie Gateway
(where moisture conservation is an issue, so that the private benefits of
adopting conservation tillage may be highest) and the highest payments in
the Eastern Uplands. Finally, for crop residue use, average NPV of EQIP
payments range from $8.53 to $20.48.
The net present value of government payments that leverage Conservation
Compliance is generally larger than these payments for conservation prac-
tice adoption. Among farm program participants with HEL cropland, two-
thirds of HEL acres were on farms that received $15 or more in overall gov-
ernment payments per HEL acre in 1997 (fig. 9). The current farm bill
extends payments for 6 years. Discounted at 4 percent, the NPV of a $15-
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Moreover, producers may expect that income support payments will be
extended indefinitely. The NPV of a $15-per-acre annual payment over 20
years would be $204—more than enough to leverage the adoption of one or
more conservation practices. 
As expected, the cost of complying (as measured by willingness to accept
EQIP payments) is generally lower than the benefits of farm program partici-
pation (the value of program payments). Actual costs are unlikely to be higher
than producer willingness to accept but can be lower. These findings are con-
sistent with a high rate of compliance. Low costs may also help explain the
fact that, for the period analyzed, erosion reduction was widespread, occurring
on land that is not subject to compliance, as well as land that is. 
Analysis of Swampbuster
Unlike highly erodible land conservation, wetland conservation provisions
interact significantly with both Federal and State regulatory requirements
and apply largely to land that is not currently in crop production. We focus
our analysis on the potential for wetland conversion without Swampbuster
sanctions and on the implication of changing Federal wetland regulations. 
Roughly 92 million acres of wetland are potentially subject to Swampbuster
(Claassen et al., 1998). Between 1986 and 1997, a total of 26,597 acres of
wetland were drained in violation of Swampbuster by 1,136 producers
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Table 6—Average EQIP incentive payments for selected conservation practices, by region
Average annual payment Net present value over 3 years
ERS Farm Conservation Conservation Residue mgmt. Conservation Conservation Residue mgmt.
Resource Region cropping tillage* (seasonal) cropping tillage* (seasonal)
Dollars per acre
Heartland 6.44 9.10 7.09 17.86 25.26 18.60
Northern Crescent 6.94 9.26 7.33 19.25 25.68 19.24
Northern Great Plains 5.13 10.88 4.98 14.23 30.18 13.08
Prairie Gateway 3.73 6.81 4.29 10.36 18.89 11.26
Eastern Uplands 8.84 11.45 7.56 24.53 31.77 19.85
Southern Seaboard 9.64 6.94 7.44 26.74 19.25 19.52
Fruitful Rim 7.16 8.32 7.80 19.87 23.10 20.48
Basin and Range 8.20 7.23 3.25 22.74 20.07 8.53
Mississippi Portal 5.35 10.28 4.91 14.86 28.54 12.87
*Practice 329b, "Mulch Till" in the NRCS Field Office Technical Guide.
Source: ERS analysis of EQIP database (NRCS).
Table 5—Average and 95th percentile EQIP incentive payments for selected conservation practices
3-year NPV of 3-year NPV of Number of
Conservation practice  Average annual 95th percentile average annual 95th percentile contracts
--------------------------Dollars per acre--------------------------
Conservation cropping 6.82 10.00 18.92 27.75 3,386
No tillage 11.90 20.00 33.02 55.50 7,664
Conservation tillage* 7.34 12.04 20.36 33.40 3,523
Crop residue use 5.25 10.00 14.58 27.75 4,309
*Practice 329b, "Mulch Till" in the NRCS Field Office Technical Guide.
Source: ERS analysis of EQIP database (NRCS).resulting in the loss of $12.3 million in Federal farm program benefits
(Claassen et al., 2000). In recent decades, wetland conversion for agricultur-
al production has decreased steadily, a trend older than Swampbuster (1985)
or the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Conversion of wetland for crop production
averaged 593,000 acres per year in 1954-74 (Frayer et al., 1983), dropping
to 235,000 acres for 1974-84 (Dahl and Johnson, 1991), 31,000 acres per
year between 1982 and 1992, and 26,000 acres per year between 1992 and
1997 (USDA-NRCS, 2002a).
Evidence on the role of policy change in reducing wetland conversion for
agriculture is mixed (see Heimlich et al.,1998, for a full survey).
Swampbuster penalties will constrain wetland conversion only when: (1)
wetlands are located on farms that participate in Federal programs subject to
Swampbuster; (2) those wetlands could be profitably converted to crop pro-
duction in the absence of Swampbuster; and (3) other policies (e.g., Section
404 of the Clean Water Act) are not applicable or not effective in deterring
wetland conversion.
First, Swampbuster will constrain wetland conversion only if wetlands are
located on farms that receive government payments. The spatial distribution
of government payments and wetland acreage subject to Swampbuster,
shown in figure 11, suggests that many wetlands are located in areas that
receive only modest payments per cropland acre. Many of these wetlands,
however, are located in remote areas and are unlikely to be converted to
cropland because they cannot be easily incorporated into an existing farm-
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Figure 11




23.69 - 137.13 
No data
Source: Farm Service Agency and NRI data.
1 dot = 25,000 acres 
of wetlandsing operation. We estimate that only 12.9 million wetland acres are directly
adjacent to existing cropland11 (fig. 12). As might be expected, these wet-
lands are much more likely to be located in areas that receive larger govern-
ment payments, increasing the likelihood that these wetlands are, in fact,
located on or near farms that receive government payments. 
Of course, the fact that wetlands are adjacent to cropland does not imply
that they can be profitably converted to crop production. Some researchers
have questioned whether wetland conversion for crop production is prof-
itable even without Swampbuster (Tolman, 1997; Kramer and Shabman,
1993). Profitability depends on a variety of factors, including crop prices
and production costs, soil productivity, and the feasibility and cost of land
clearing and drainage. Roughly half of all wetlands in the conterminous
United States in 1780 have already been drained (Dahl, 1990), and remain-
ing wetlands may be more difficult or expensive to convert or may be less
productive once converted. 
Using more detailed data on the potential productivity of wetland soils,
other research suggests that there are wetlands that could be profitably con-
verted to crops in the absence of policy constraints. Assuming that only
those wetlands that are adjacent to cropland are vulnerable to conversion,
Claassen et al. (2000) estimate that between 1.5 and 3.3 million acres of
wetlands have sufficiently high productivity to be converted to crop produc-
tion, depending on producer price expectations. Also, profitability of crop
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of wetlands adjacent 
to cropland
11We used the habitat composition
variables in the NRI data to determine
whether a wetland point is near crop-
land. We considered NRI points classi-
fied as wetland to be “adjacent” to
cropland if some cropland occurred
along any one of four 500 foot-long
transects that extend NW, NE, SE, and
SW from the NRI point, as indicated
by the habitat composition variables.production on the converted land is not the only consideration in the deci-
sion to drain wetland. Wetlands are sometimes drained to increase the effi-
ciency of field operations on existing cropland by eliminating wetland areas
that producers must farm around. Roughly 5 million acres of wetland are
dry enough in some years for crop production. Although producers may
continue to farm these wetlands in their current condition without violating
Swampbuster, these wetlands may be particularly vulnerable to additional
drainage that would improve production and make field operation more 
efficient. 
Even if wetland conversion potential is, in fact, quite modest, these conver-
sions could significantly undercut wetland restoration efforts. By the end of
fiscal year 2002, about 1.275 million acres had been restored through the
Wetlands Reserve Program (USDA-NRCS, 2002b). Another 1.6 million
wetland acres have been restored through the Conservation Reserve
Program (USDA-FSA, 2003). Thus, the total USDA wetland restoration
effort since 1990 is less than 3 million acres.
Finally, other laws and regulations that can stop or discourage wetland
drainage include Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and numerous
State and local laws. However, these laws and regulations do not completely
protect all wetlands. Section 404 is limited in geographic scope following a
recent Supreme Court decision that excludes many isolated wetlands from
CWA regulation. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC)
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Court ruled that
USACE could no longer claim jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable,
intrastate ponds on grounds that they are used by economically important
species of birds migrating across State lines (National Wetlands Newsletter,
2001). Known as the migratory bird rule, this rationale has often been used to
assert CWA jurisdiction over isolated wetlands. The exact extent of wetlands
thus excluded from CWA regulation is yet to be determined and will probably
be decided by the courts. A patchwork of State and local regulations contin-
ues, but provides little or no wetland protection in many States (Kusler, 2001).
State wetland regulations exist in the Northeast, States surrounding the Great
Lakes, Atlantic Coast States in the South, and along the West Coast (Petrie et
al., 2001). Many heavily agricultural Midwestern and Plains States have little,
if any, State wetland regulation. In these areas, Swampbuster is the only
remaining policy disincentive to draining isolated wetlands.
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Nutrient Management in Crop Production
At present, compliance mechanisms are used only to encourage soil and
wetland conservation, although agricultural production can result in a wider
range of environmental damages (Claassen et al., 2001). In this section, we
look at the potential for extending compliance to a third agri-
environmental issue: reducing nutrient runoff and leaching from land in
crop production. 
Runoff and leaching from fertilizer application and animal manure are
major sources of remaining U.S. water quality problems (USEPA and
USDA, 1998). Nitrogen leaching into groundwater used for drinking can be
a health hazard to infants and may pose a cancer risk for adults. Excess
nutrients in surface water can lead to eutrophication, reducing the quality of
water for recreation and habitat. Eutrophication results from excess algae
growth which leads to high concentrations of bacteria (to break down dead
algae), which, in turn, leads to accumulation of bacterial waste and oxygen
depletion. Water becomes murky and develops an odor. In severe cases,
aquatic plants and fish are damaged by the lack of sunlight and oxygen. 
Nitrate nitrogen is highly soluble and is transported in both ground and sur-
face water. In surface waters, nitrogen can be transported long distances,
polluting estuaries throughout the Nation (Bricker et al., 1999). Nitrogen
flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, largely from the Mississippi River, is the
suspected cause of a large zone of oxygen-depleted (hypoxic) waters
(Goolsby, 1999), creating a “dead zone” largely devoid of marine life.
Phosphorus is far less soluble and is most often transported to water along
with sediment (USGS, 1999). Excess phosphorus runoff from agriculture
may have contributed to outbreaks of waterborne pathogens, including pfi-
esteria piscicida (Mlot, 1997). 
To determine the potential of a compliance mechanism to mitigate runoff
and leaching of agricultural nutrients, we consider three key questions:
• To what extent is nutrient application—either commercial fertilizer or
manure—to land in crop production a source of nutrient runoff or 
leaching?
• To what extent do crop producers who have the greatest potential for
reducing nutrient runoff and leaching also participate in farm programs?
• Are government payments large enough to encourage broad adoption of
practices that could reduce nutrient runoff and leaching?
Nutrient Loss and Crop Producers
While a comprehensive solution to agricultural nutrient runoff and leaching
must involve crop and livestock producers, compliance incentives are largest
for farms with a significant area of land in program crop production. Crop pro-
ducers—regardless of whether they are also livestock producers—will play a
central role in managing nutrients and reducing nutrient runoff from agricul-
ture. Available evidence suggests that the application of commercial fertilizer
has, in the past, accounted for a significant share of agricultural nutrient runoff
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nutrient runoff and leaching, independent of livestock producers. Moreover, as
livestock production becomes increasingly concentrated on large, specialized
farms, an increasing proportion of livestock is raised on farms with too little
land to spread nutrients at agronomically sound rates (Kellogg et al., 2000),
indicating that management of livestock waste will necessarily involve crop
producers who do not raise livestock (Ribaudo et al., 2003).
In the past, commercial fertilizer has accounted for roughly 90 percent of nitro-
gen applied in agricultural production. Just over 12 million tons of nitrogen
fertilizer was applied in 1997 (Daberkow et al., 2000). Only 1.2 million tons of
nitrogen is recoverable from manure nutrients produced on U.S. farms with
confined livestock (Gollehon et al., 2001), although not all of these manure
nutrients are actually used in crop production.12 Evidence also suggests that
fertilizers are routinely applied in amounts that exceed crop needs. Roughly 70
percent of corn acres and 60 percent of winter wheat and cotton acres had
high13 excess nitrogen balances in 1995, while high excess phosphorus bal-
ances were estimated to exist on roughly 40 percent of corn, cotton, and wheat
acres (Daberkow et al., 2000). Nutrients applied in excess of or well in
advance of crop needs are particularly vulnerable to runoff and leaching. 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates also indicate that, in the past,
commercial fertilizer has accounted for a significant share of nitrogen runoff
to surface water. Fertilizer application accounts, on average, for more than
48 percent of all nitrogen loads to surface water in areas where nitrogen
runoff per unit of land area is high (greater than 1,000 kg/km2 annually) and
more than 20 percent, on average, where runoff is low (less than 500
kg/km2 annually) (Smith et al., 1997). Livestock waste production is esti-
mated to account for 15 and 12 percent of nitrogen reaching surface water
in high- and low-runoff areas, respectively. Where nitrogen loads are low,
runoff from nonagricultural land is a relatively important source of nitrogen
loading (Smith et al., 1997).
Phosphorus runoff to surface water is much more likely to be the result of live-
stock waste or nonagricultural, nonpoint sources. In areas where USGS
researchers estimate that phosphorus surface-water concentrations exceed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suggested water quality goal of 0.1
mg/L, fertilizer is estimated to account, on average, for 21 percent of phospho-
rus loading while livestock waste and nonagricultural land are estimated to
account for 38 and 33 percent, respectively (Smith et al., 1997). As noted
above, however, many cropland acres carry excess phosphorus balances. Thus,
non-waste phosphorus management on cropland may still be important to
reducing phosphorus damage to surface water, particularly in areas where live-
stock production is less prevalent and commercial phosphorus fertilizer is
applied. 
Nutrient Runoff and Farm Program Participation
While nutrient application in crop production contributes significantly to the
runoff and leaching of nutrients to water, the potential for nutrient loss may
vary across producers. If so, to what extent do producers who have signifi-
cant potential for nutrient loss also participate in farm programs? To gauge
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12While almost all manure is even-
tually disposed of through landspread-
ing, it is not clear that all recoverable
manure nutrients are applied to agri-
cultural land as fertilizer. Increasing
concentration in livestock production
has resulted in concentrations of ani-
mal waste that often exceed the nutri-
ent needs of crops grown on the farm.
Manure may be stockpiled for extend-
ed periods, in which case much of the
recoverable nutrient is lost to the envi-
ronment. In some cases, transportation
costs preclude full utilization of live-
stock manure as fertilizer (Gollehon et
al., 2001; Ribaudo et al., 2003). 
13A “high” excess nutrient balance
is defined as available nutrients
exceeding crop nutrient use by 25 
percent or more.runoff potential, we use indices for potential nitrogen runoff, phosphorus
runoff, and nitrogen leaching to groundwater developed by Lemunyon and
Gilbert (1993), Sharpley et al., (1994) and Gburek et al. (2000). The indices
are calculated for each NRI data point using NRI and other data and account
for soil factors, climate, and production management decisions that affect
runoff and leaching (see Appendix 2). 
Using these indices, we divided cropland acres into five equal (by land area)
categories by overall potential for nitrogen runoff, phosphorus runoff, and
nitrogen leaching (we label these very low, low, medium, high, very high).
We overlaid data on the 20 percent of cropland acres with very high poten-
tial for nitrogen and phosphorus runoff or nitrogen leaching with data on
government payments (figs. 13, 14, and 15). Results suggest that acres with
the highest potential for nutrient runoff and leaching are located mostly in
areas with relatively high government payments. Unlike highly erodible
cropland acres, which often occur in more (economically) marginal agricul-
tural areas, nutrient runoff and leaching appear to be most problematic
where crop production is the principal agricultural land use and soils are
highly productive.
Using methods detailed in Appendix 1, we estimate that 75 percent or more
of cropland acres with medium, high, or very high potential for phosphorus
runoff, nitrogen leaching, or nitrogen runoff are located on farms that
receive government payments (fig. 16). The average annual payment
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Figure 15
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nitrogen leaching potentialexceeds $15 per cropland acre on farms with medium to very high nutrient
loss potential for all three nutrient loss indicators, exceeding $20 per acre in
several cases (fig. 17). Thus, farms with the highest nutrient loss potential
tend to participate heavily in farm programs and receive larger-than-average
per-acre payments. Note, again, that the payment data used in this study are
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Figure 16
Percent of cropland acres on farms receiving and not receiving 
payments, by potential nutrient loss to water, 1997
Source: Farm Service Agency and ERS.
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Dollars per cropland acrefrom 1997, a year of low payments relative to spending in more recent years
and projected spending under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment
(FSRI) Act. Whether these payments are large enough to leverage actions
that would produce significant reductions in nutrient runoff and leaching
depends on the techniques available to reduce nutrient runoff and the cost of
implementing them.
Reducing Nutrient Runoff:
Nutrient Management and Buffer Practices
Our results to this point suggest that (1) nutrient application by crop 
producers is a large source of agricultural nutrient runoff and leaching, and
(2) producers with medium to very high potential for nutrient loss also par-
ticipate heavily in farm programs. Next, we consider practices for reducing
nutrient runoff and leaching. Are these practices effective and enforceable?
Are government payments large enough to encourage widespread adoption
if program eligibility was contingent on the application of these practices?
One way to reduce nutrient loss from cropland is to encourage crop produc-
ers to manage nutrients more carefully. The objective of nutrient manage-
ment is to match nutrient application rates, timing, and placement to plant
needs (accounting for nutrients already available in the soil), thereby mini-
mizing the level of “excess” nutrient (nutrient in excess of crop uptake) in
the soil at any given time. Excess nutrients are most vulnerable to loss.
Nutrient management is actually a collection of practices designed to help
farmers match nutrient applications to nutrient needs (e.g., soil testing, split
fertilizer application, legume crediting, reasonable yield goals, etc.). 
Because it is a collection of practices that can be combined in many ways,
nutrient management is flexible and can be tailored to each farm’s unique
circumstances, making it a potentially cost-effective way to reduce excess
nutrients in the soil. However, because nutrient application rates, methods,
and timing are very difficult to observe, enforcement could be difficult and
expensive (Malik, 1993; Amacher and Malik, 1996, 1998; Johansson, 2002).
Nor is it guaranteed that nutrient management will reduce runoff and leach-
ing to levels consistent with significantly improved water quality. If heavy
rains fall just after fertilizer application, significant runoff and leaching can
still occur, even if application is timed to better coincide with plant needs. 
A second way to address nutrient runoff is through the use of buffer prac-
tices, such as filter strips, grassed waterways, or restored wetlands to inter-
cept nutrients before they leave the field or farm. Buffer practices can
remove a substantial proportion of the sediment and nutrients from field
runoff. A recent survey article (Dosskey, 2001) shows that, on average, filter
strips remove 50-90 percent of nitrogen and phosphorus from runoff. Unlike
nutrient management, buffer practices are easily enforceable because their
existence and effectiveness are readily observed. Buffers can be more
expensive to implement because some cropland is taken out of production,
and will be ineffective where nitrogen leaches to ground water or reaches
water bodies through subsurface flow.
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If nutrient management became a condition of eligibility for farm programs,
use of nutrient management would increase only if nutrient management
costs were lower than the net benefits of farm program participation (prior
to the addition of the nutrient management requirement), and if the require-
ments were effectively enforced. As with soil conservation practices, the
cost of nutrient management is likely to vary significantly among producers,
and may depend on cropping patterns, soils, climate, management skill, and
producers’ risk preferences. Nutrient management plans typically include a
variety of practices or management decisions that affect the overall amount
of nutrient applied, the timing of fertilizer applications, and the method of
application. For some producers, nutrient management could lower fertilizer
bills. For others, lower fertilizer bills might be more than offset by the cost
of soil and plant tissue testing, increased cost of fertilizer application, or
increased risk of delayed application that can decrease crop yields. 
Determining the appropriate level of nutrient application involves testing
the soil to determine available nutrients, and, in cases where nutrients are
applied to a growing crop (side dressing), other tests (such as plant tissue
testing) to determine plant needs. Sample collection and testing can be time-
consuming and costly. Even with soil and plant tissue tests, uncertainty
about the relationship between nutrient application and crop yields can
expose producers to the risk of low yields as they attempt to match nutrient
application to plant needs. Research shows that assumptions about the rela-
tionship between nutrient uptake and crop yields can significantly affect cal-
culation of an optimal fertilizer application rate (Grimm et al., 1987; Larsen
et al., 1996), possibly leading to overfertilization or lower-than-expected
crop yields. Year-to-year variation in growing conditions may also encour-
age overapplication of nutrients. Because crop nutrient needs are higher in
years with good growing conditions, it may be profitable to use more fertil-
izer in anticipation of getting peak yields in particularly good years
(Babcock, 1992; Dai et al., 1993).
Timing fertilizer applications to coincide with plant nutrient demand can
also expose producers to higher cost and risk. Fertilizer prices tend to be
lower in the fall, well in advance of planting (Huang et al., 1994), possibly
making fall or early spring application less costly, even if more fertilizer is
needed to make up for the runoff and leaching losses. Higher application
costs are incurred in the use of “split” application, where fertilizer is applied
at planting and during the growing season when plant needs are high.
Moreover, delaying fertilizer application exposes producers to the risk of
weather-related delays when plant needs are high. Some producers may rely
on early application to reduce this risk (Huang et al., 1994; Feinerman et al.,
1990). Better fertilizer placement can also reduce fertilizer use, but may
increase application costs. For example, planter-mounted application attach-
ments allow fertilizer to be placed directly in the root zone, increasing plant
uptake. Fertilizer savings, however, must be considered against the cost of
additional equipment. 
Again, we use the EQIP database to provide a sense of the range of poten-
tial costs for nutrient management. Bear in mind that EQIP data represent
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14The authors greatfully acknowl-
edge the contribution of Glen Sheriff
to the development of this section.the level of payments some producers were willing to accept (WTA) for
undertaking nutrient management—not necessarily the actual out-of-pocket
cost of the practices. For some practices, producer WTA may be higher than
out-of-pocket costs. For example, the cost of soil sample testing may be
small compared with the opportunity cost of the time required to collect soil
samples. On the other hand, fertilizer cost savings could offset some portion
of these costs. 
Nationally, EQIP participants adopting nutrient management in crop produc-
tion received an average of $7.30 per acre, while 95 percent of these pro-
ducers received $15 or less. Given a 3-year payment period and a 4-percent
rate of discount, the net present value (NPV) of the average payment is
$19.20 with 95 percent of producers receiving $39.45 or less. By region, the
NPV of average incentive payments ranges from $12.82 in the Mississippi
Portal, where 95 percent of participants received $14.03 or less, up to an
average of $26.80 in the Fruitful Rim, where 95 percent of participants
received $55.50 or less (table 7). A $20-per-acre annual commodity program
payment would translate into $95 over 6 years and $212 over 20 years—
substantially more than EQIP participants in any region of the country are
willing to accept for undertaking nutrient management.
Cost of Buffer Practices
The term “buffer practices” refers to a range of practices that are designed
to intercept sediment and nutrients at the edge of the field or farm. For
example, practices eligible for continuous signup in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) that are particularly relevant for nutrient runoff
include riparian buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, and contour grass
strips. The cost of buffer practices may include the establishment of vegeta-
tive cover, land shaping, and the retirement of productive cropland, although
only a small amount of land is required. In the case of filter strips, for
example, only 1-3 percent of the area drained through a filter strip is needed
in the filter.15
One source of information on producers’ willingness to accept payment for
installing buffer practices is the CRP continuous signup for high-priority
practices. High-priority practices include filter strips, grassed waterways,
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15For filter strips, minimum area
depends on two factors. First, the ratio
of drainage area to filter strip size
depends on the RUSLE (Revised
Universal Soil Loss Equation) R-
factor. For R-factors of 0-35, a field-
to-filter strip area ratio of 70:1 is
appropriate, 60:1 is required for R-fac-
tors of 35-175, and 50:1 is needed for
R-factors greater than 175. Second, fil-
ter strips must have a minimum flow
length (width) of 30 feet. Depending
on the size and shape of the field, this
requirement may result in a larger
field-to-filter strip area ratio than oth-
erwise required. For more information,
see USDA-NRCS, 2002c.
Table 7—Average and 95th percentile EQIP incentive payments for nutrient management
ERS Farm 3-year NPV of 3-year NPV of Number of
Resource Region Average annual 95th percentile average annual 95th percentile contracts
--------------------------Dollars per acre--------------------------
Heartland 7.07 12.00 19.61 33.29 9,819
Northern Crescent 5.96 11.99 16.55 33.28 7,728
Northern Great Plains 7.30 13.67 20.26 37.93 847
Prairie Gateway 6.60 17.25 18.32 47.87 6,460
Eastern Uplands 8.51 10.29 23.63 28.55 2,546
Southern Seaboard 8.45 10.00 23.44 27.75 14,787
Fruitful Rim 9.66 20.00 26.80 55.50 2,922
Basin and Range 7.13 25.00 19.79 69.38 950
Mississippi Portal 4.62 5.06 12.82 14.03 3,361
U.S. 7.31 15.00 20.29 41.63 49,420
Source: ERS analysis of EQIP data.contour grass strips, and other buffer practices. Nationally, continuous
signup acres receive an average payment of $92 per acre per year, more
than double the average payment for land in general CRP signup ($43 per
acre per year) (Barbarika, 2001). Up to 50 percent cost sharing is also pro-
vided for practice installation. Cost-share amounts for some common buffer
practices include $59 per acre for contour grass strips, $69 for grass filter
strips, and $209 for riparian buffers. Because buffer practices generally
involve only a small proportion of cropland acres, the overall cost per crop-
land acre is modest. 
As an example, consider installation of a grass filter strip. Assume that $92
per acre represents foregone annual returns, per acre establishment costs are
twice the average cost share listed above (50 percent of cost is shared in
CRP), and 2.5 percent of cropland is needed. Capitalizing forgone revenue at
4 percent, a grass filter strip would cost roughly $2.50 per cropland acre per
year. This is well below the average program payment of $15-20 per acre (or
more in recent years) on farms with the most serious nutrient loss potential.
Wetland restoration could also be used to intercept nitrogen runoff before it
contaminates surface water. Ribaudo et al. (2001) compare nitrogen use
reduction to wetland restoration strategies for reducing nitrogen flows from
the Mississippi Basin to the Gulf of Mexico. For nitrogen runoff reductions
of up to 26 percent, they found that reducing nitrogen use was the less
expensive strategy, while wetland restoration would be more cost-effective
in achieving larger runoff reductions. Wetland restoration can be more
expensive than other buffer practices ($50-$800 per wetland acre in the
Ribaudo study), in addition to the opportunity cost of ending crop produc-
tion, and will not be appropriate for all locations. Nonetheless, wetland
restoration could play a role in reducing nitrogen runoff to water. 
Assuming payments will continue indefinitely, compliance could provide
sufficient leverage for widespread adoption of either nutrient management
to reduce the potential for nutrient loss or conservation buffers to intercept
nutrient runoff. While this new compliance requirement could be leveraged
with existing program payments, some producers who would be subject to
the new requirement are already bearing the cost of existing compliance
requirements. Figure 18 shows the potential for overlap between existing
compliance requirements and a potential nutrient-related requirement. Map
colors indicate land subject to existing compliance requirements—non-
cropped wetland and highly erodible land (HEL) near existing cropland and
HEL cropland—as a proportion of total cropland. The darker the color, the
larger the potential impact of existing compliance mechanisms. The dots
represent land with high or very high potential for nutrient runoff and leach-
ing—those acres most likely to be affected by a nutrient requirement. 
The greatest potential for overlap between the potential nutrient requirement
and existing compliance requirements appears to be in the Heartland and the
Mississippi Portal, particularly northern portions in Arkansas and Tennessee.
Significant overlap may also occur in Eastern Pennsylvania and Maryland. 
In the Corn Belt and Mississippi River Delta, crop production is a predomi-
nant agricultural enterprise and related farm program payments are relatively
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aged more than $23 per acre (represented by the darkest shaded areas in 
fig. 1). Over the 6-year life of the farm bill, the net present value of a $23
stream of annual payments would be $109.63 per acre. Keep in mind that
commodity program payments were relatively low in 1997 and that farm
commodity programs are likely to continue past the end of the current farm
bill. 
Meanwhile, regional average costs for soil conservation and nutrient man-
agement practices are at or near national averages (see tables 5, 6, and 7). In
areas where the overlap is most likely, moreover, nutrient management costs
may be lower than the cost of addressing soil erosion. Because the cost of
erosion reduction is modest, the combined cost of erosion reduction and
nutrient management is unlikely to exceed (or even come close to) the value
of farm program payments. In the Mississippi Portal region, the total cost
for making a transition to the use of soil conservation practices is larger for
each of the most commonly used practices. Producer willingness to accept
(WTA) payments for conservation cropping, conservation tillage, and sea-
sonal residue management are $14.86, $28.54, and $12.87 per acre, respec-
tively, while WTA for nutrient management averaged $12.80 (see tables 5,
6, and 7). In the Heartland region, WTA for conservation cropping, conser-
vation tillage, and seasonal residue management is $17.86, $25.26, and
$18.60 per acre, respectively, while WTA for nutrient management averages
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Figure 18
Potential for overlap between existing compliance requirements and nutrient requirement
Proportion of 







Source: ERS and NRI data.
1 dot = 25,000 acres of 
very high nutrient runoff or 
leaching potential$19.60. Nonetheless, a new nutrient-related compliance requirement could
cause financial stress for some producers. Specific cases of hardship could
be addressed through variances (as under existing policy).
In Pennsylvania and Maryland, crop production is significant but nutrient
problems are more likely to be driven by livestock waste. In most counties
in these areas, nitrogen and phosphorus in livestock waste already exceed
the assimilative capacity of cropland and pasture land (Kellogg et al., 2000).
Farm program payments are not as uniformly high as they are in the
Heartland and the Mississippi Portal, so the compliance requirement may be
less effective overall. However, recently promulgated Clean Water Act regu-
lations require comprehensive nutrient management on large livestock oper-
ations. Also, changes in EQIP eligibility requirements and funding levels
will assist livestock producers in reducing environmental damage from
excess nutrients. In this context, the compliance requirement may be a use-
ful part of the overall mix of policies designed to reduce nutrient loss to the
environment. 
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Compliance mechanisms were enacted primarily as a method of removing
inconsistencies between farm income support and conservation programs.
However, compliance mechanisms are also unique policy tools that, when
used in conjunction with existing commodity programs, possess some desir-
able economic properties. Compliance mechanisms are less likely than sub-
sidies to produce unintended consequences and may be effective when sub-
sidy programs can be especially difficult or costly to use. Because compli-
ance mechanisms depend on other programs, however, their effectiveness is
limited. Problems associated largely with program crop production, such as
soil erosion and nutrient runoff from fertilizer application, are good candi-
dates for a compliance requirement. The design of the compliance require-
ment (i.e., environmental standards or practice requirements) will determine
the cost and enforceability of the compliance requirement. 
While USDA’s Compliance Status Review process appears to have flaws, it
is also likely that compliance rates are high and that significant erosion
reduction has been achieved on land subject to Conservation Compliance.
Our analysis shows that most highly erodible cropland (HEL), particularly
wind-erodible cropland, is located on farms that receive government pay-
ments. More important, reduction in excess erosion on HEL cropland—the
erosion specifically targeted by Conservation Compliance—has been larger
on farms receiving payments (farms subject to compliance) than on farms
not receiving payments, particularly for wind-erodible soils. Placing compli-
ance in a larger context, however, we find that soil erosion rates have
declined on both HEL and non-HEL cropland, in all regions of the country,
and on farms receiving program payments as well as those not receiving
program payments. 
These results could be consistent with more than one hypothesis about the
role of Conservation Compliance in reducing soil erosion. Compliance
could be viewed as prompting the adoption of soil conservation practices.
On the other hand, one could argue that practices like conservation tillage
would eventually have been adopted where they are cost-effective, regard-
less of Conservation Compliance. In other words, the compliance require-
ment happened to coincide with a period of technical change favorable to
soil erosion reduction. Finally, Conservation Compliance may have acceler-
ated the adoption of low- or no-cost practices. For example, conservation
tillage may have spread more rapidly in areas where it was shown to be
cost-effective by producers who adopted it in response to compliance. 
Likewise, evidence suggests that Swampbuster was only one factor among
several that could have explained the rapid drop in wetland conversion for
agricultural production. A dwindling number of easily convertible wetland
acres and long-term declines in real prices for agricultural commodities may
also be contributing to reductions in wetland drainage for crop production.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, however, Swampbuster may be a more important component of
U.S. wetland conservation policy.
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crop production, whether through management of nutrient application or
interception of nutrients with buffer practices (or both), could provide some
additional environmental benefits. Farms where nutrient runoff to water is
high are quite likely to receive substantial government payments. Moreover,
our analysis shows that the value of government payments will generally
exceed the cost of addressing nutrient loss through either nutrient manage-
ment or buffer practices, suggesting that a compliance mechanism could be
effective in leveraging the adoption of practices designed to reduce nutrient
runoff. It is important to note that some producers who are already bearing
the cost of HEL or wetland conservation requirements are also located in
areas where nutrient-related compliance requirements would likely be most
significant. Where crop production is predominant (the Heartland and
Mississippi Portal regions), farm program payments are also large and
would likely provide ample incentive for the additional requirement. Where
much of the excess nutrient is generated by livestock production
(Pennsylvania and Maryland), compliance alone might be less effective, but
could complement other policies designed to reduce nutrient loss to the
environment. 
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to Farm-Level Data
Environmental indicators are linked spatially to farm-level economic data
using a Geographic Information System (GIS). GIS techniques are used to
create "surfaces" of environmental indicator values. Farm-level data are
then linked to indicators by locating the farm on the environmental indicator
surface and assigning the surface value at that location. Results are then
aggregated to the national or ERS Farm Resource Region level. This spatial
association is valid to the extent that spatial variations in climate, land
resources (e.g., soil productivity and erodibility), and farms (e.g., variation
in crops and production practices) are interrelated. ERS Farm Resource
Regions are, in fact, based on identification of areas with relatively uniform
farms, soils, and climate. The regions are based in part on a cluster analysis
of U.S. farm characteristics (Sommer and Hines, 1991) and on USDA land
resource regions (USDA-SCS, 1981).
Environmental indicators are based largely on data from the National
Resources Inventory (NRI). NRI point data files are collected and main-
tained by the USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and
contain detailed data on land use and condition for each of more than
800,000 points nationwide, including estimates of water (sheet and rill) and
wind erosion on cropland. Surfaces for highly erodible land, acres with
excess erosion, and the change in excess erosion are derived from NRI.
Data from other sources are combined with NRI to create the nitrogen and
phosphorus runoff and nitrogen leaching indices described in Appendix 2. 
The surfacing technique employed is the Average Shifted Histogram (ASH)
estimator, which is a non-parametric regression procedure designed to
assess the density of certain characteristics in the overall land base, e.g., the
prevalence of highly erodible land. Indicator surface values are developed
on a per-cropland-acre basis to facilitate combining these measures with
ARMS data. For HEL cropland, for example, the surface value is the
proportion of cropland acres that are highly erodible.
The distribution of farms by commodity specialization and program
payments is derived from the 1997 Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS). ARMS is an annual sample survey of farms and agricul-
tural commodities conducted to obtain information about the status of
farmers' finances; production practices for specific commodities; use of
natural, physical, and financial resources; and household economic well-
being. Sponsored jointly by ERS and USDA’s National Agricultural Statis-
tics Service (NASS), ARMS began in 1996 as a synthesis of the former
USDA cropping practice, chemical use, and farm costs and returns surveys,
which dated back to 1975. Of particular interest for our application, agricul-
tural producers16 are asked about land use, cropping patterns, and govern-
ment program participation. 
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16Defined as "all establishments
except institutional farms that sold or
would normally have sold at least
$1,000 of agricultural products during
the year" in the 48 contiguous States.
For more information, see
www.ers.usda.gov\Briefing\ARMS.Regional or national estimates of acreage with specific environmental char-
acteristics (e.g., the number of HEL cropland acres) on farm with payments
are calculated as:
where γk is a zero-one indicator of whether farm k receives farm program
payments that would make it subject to conservation compliance; Αk
ARMS is
the cropland acreage in farm k in Phase III of ARMS; and ρik is the value
per acre of indicator i in the area where farm k is located. The variable ρik is
constructed using the surfacing techniques described above. Because farms
surveyed in Phase III of ARMS are located only at the county level, values
for ρik are assigned at the center of the county (the county centroid). 
This procedure provides estimates that are often quite close to the original
NRI estimates. Appendix table 1 provides estimates reported in the text
(derived using the procedure detailed above) and estimates derived directly
from NRI. National estimates of the extent of land that is highly erodible
due to the potential for water (sheet and rill) erosion are extremely close to
NRI estimates. Using the ARMS-NRI merged data, we estimate that 55.19
million acres are highly erodible due to water, less than 1 percent higher
than the 54.69-million-acre estimate obtained directly from NRI. For wind
erosion, the ARMS-NRI merged data indicate 55.54 million acres are highly
erodible, about 7 percent higher than the 51.61-million-acre estimate
obtained directly from NRI. 
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Appendix table 1—Acreage estimates using indictor surfaces and
ARMS versus acreage estimates directly from NRI
Estimate NRI estimate Difference
million acres percent
HEL cropland, wind 55.54 51.61 7.61
HEL cropland, water 55.19 54.69 0.91
Total HEL cropland, by region
Prairie Gateway 30.24 26.67 13.39
Heartland 23.25 23.24 0.04
Northern Great Plains 17.04 18.49 -7.84
Northern Crescent 10.08 9.77 3.17
Fruitful Rim 8.81 7.31 20.52
Basin and Range 7.43 6.54 13.61
Eastern Uplands 7.29 5.77 26.34
Southern Seaboard 2.81 3.63 -22.59
Mississippi Portal 1.80 2.31 -22.08
HEL cropland, wind, erosion>T* 25.38 22.26 14.02
HEL cropland, water, erosion>T*  34.71 34.95 -0.69
*T is the soil loss tolerance, the maximum rate of soil loss that can be sustained indefinitely
without productivity damage.
Source: ERS analysis of NRI and ARMS data.Appendix 2. Methodology for Constructing
Nutrient Loss Indices 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus Runoff Index
The Nitrogen and Phosphorus Runoff Indexes are based upon "The modi-
fied P index system to rate the potential P loss in runoff from site character-
istics" found in A Conceptual Approach for Integrating Phosphorus and
Nitrogen Management at Watershed Scales by Heathwaite et al., 2000.
The indexes consist of four transport factors and two source factors. Index
scores, based on the factors described below, are computed as:
Nitrogen score = (soil erosion index score * runoff index score *
irrigation index score * distance to water index score) * (commer-
cial nitrogen application + manure nitrogen application)
Phosphorus score = (soil erosion index score * runoff index score
* irrigation index score * distance to water index score) * (commer-
cial phosphorus application + manure phosphorus application)
The indexes are calculated for each cropland data point in the 1997 National
Resources Inventory (NRI) database, excluding land in aquaculture and
horticultural crops. The NRI point data files are collected and maintained by
USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and contain
detailed information on land use and condition for more than 800,000 points
nationwide. A variety of other data sources are used to calculate some of the
individual factors.
Transport Factors
The soil erosion index score is based on estimated sheet and rill erosion
reported in the 1997 NRI. Erosion rate estimates, in tons per acre per year,
were made using the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE; see Wischmeier
and Smith, 1978). Erosion rate estimates are used to classify cropland into five
categories of roughly equal size, by acreage. Each of the five groups was then
given a score, from lowest to highest, of  0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, or 1.0, respectively.
The irrigation erosion index score is based on the existence of irrigation
and land slope, both of which are reported in the NRI. Land without irriga-
tion was assigned an irrigation erosion value of 0.6. Land slope was used to
classify irrigated cropland into four categories of roughly equal size, by
acreage. Each of the four groups was then given a score, from lowest to
highest, of  0.7, 0.8, 0.9, or 1.0, respectively.
The runoff index score is based on the methodology used by Kellogg (1997).
Average annual  precipitation was computed for each NRI point using various
sources of weather data and methods of interpolation. Runoff was then esti-
mated using a runoff curve value taken from the NRCS runoff curve table.17
The runoff curve value depends on cropping type, conservation management,
and soil hydrologic group. Cropping type was determined by land use as
shown in appendix table 2. On highly erodible land, conservation manage-
ment was considered good if erosion was less that twice the soil loss tolerance
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htmlor "T" factor. On non-highly erodible land, conservation management was
considered good if erosion was less than T. The soil hydrologic group was
taken from the Soil Interpretive Record (SIR) database associated with the
NRI. The runoff estimates were used to classify cropland into five categories
of roughly equal size, by acreage. Each of the five groups was then given a
score, from lowest to highest, of  0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, or 1.0, respectively.
The contributing distance or distance to water index score is based on
distance to water available in the 1997 NRI database. The values for distance
to water were placed into the five groups as described in Heathwaite et al.,
2000. 
Source Factors
Commercial nitrogen and phosphorus application rates are computed at the
county level. Each NRI point in a given county is assigned the county appli-
cation rates. The values were derived from commercial fertilizer expenses
from the 1997 Census of Agriculture.
Manure nitrogen and phosphorus application rates are computed at the
county level. Each NRI point in a given county is assigned the county
average application rates.
Nitrogen Leaching Index
The Nitrogen Leaching Index is based upon "The N index system to rate the
potential loss in leaching from site characteristics determining source and
transport factors" found in A Conceptual Approach for Integrating Phos-
phorus and Nitrogen Management at Watershed Scales by Heathwaite et al.,
2000.
The index consists of two transport factors and two source factors. Index
scores, based on the factors described below, are computed as:
Nitrogen score = (soil texture index score * permeability index
score) * (commercial nitrogen application + manure nitrogen 
application)
The index is calculated for each cropland data point in the 1997 NRI data-
base, excluding land in aquaculture and horticultural crops. A variety of data
sources were used to compile the individual factors. Nitrogen source factors
are as described above. 
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Appendix table 2—Runoff curve table based on NRI land use 
NRI land-use 
designation values Runoff curve cropping type
11 – 20 Row crops
111-116 Small grains
141 - 143 Meadow
170 - 180 Used most recent land-use 
designation from cropping history.
Source: National Engineering Handbook, USDA-NRCS.Transport Factors
The soil texture index score was assigned following Heathwaite et al.,
2000.18 Data on soil texture data is from the 1997 NRI point database. 
The permeability index score is based on a formula developed by Williams,
Jones, and Dyke (1984). The formula uses data on precipitation, irrigation,
and soil hydrologic group. Average annual and monthly precipitation was
computed for each NRI point using various weather data sources and interpo-
lation methods. The presence of irrigation was determined using NRI data.
The soil hydrologic group was taken from the SIR database. The permeability
estimates were used to classify cropland into five categories of roughly equal
size, by acreage. Each of the five groups was then given a score, from lowest
to highest, of 0, 1, 2, 4, or 8, respectively. 
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18A few soil texture categories that
did not appear in this publication were
assigned index scores by the authors.